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CHAPTER 4
TEMPORARY TENANCIES IN 
THE NETHERLANDS: 
FROM PRAGMATIC POLICY 
INSTRUMENT TO STRUCTURAL 
HOUSING MARKET REFORM*
Between 1997 and 2012 temporary tenancies emerged and 
evolved as a pragmatic policy instrument within the Dutch hous-
ing sector. In this chapter, based on analyses of policy docu-
ments, media content and parliamentary archives, we argue that 
this was a period of implicit, technocratic erosion of the exist-
ing permanent rental norm, creating the political and material 
foundations for the emergence of a new, more explicit ideologi-
cal discourse that has been evident since 2013. We then explore 
these most recent developments, in which temporary tenancies 
are now championed as a catalyst for structural housing market 
reform, and comment on the possibility that the recent proposal 
to introduce time-limited tenancies as a normal form of tenure, 
will lead to permanent, rather than temporary, contracts becom-
ing marginal in Dutch society.
It is moreover neither the goal to abandon the principle of the rental 
contract of unlimited duration nor to leave the system wherein tem-
porary rent is the exception to the rule. […] The intention is there-
fore to introduce in housing law a ‘time-limited tenancy’, analogous 
to business leases, on which rent ceilings will apply, but security of 
tenure will not, and the tenancy will thus end ‘automatically’ after 
the agreed period. 
Minister Blok of Housing proposing the introduction of generic tem-
porary renting contracts in the Netherlands in his letter to the Lower 
Chamber of Parliament of 11 April 2014; our translation from Dutch.
4.1 Introduction: the Dutch permanent renting norm
In some countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, 
the insecurity that comes with non-permanent residential tenancies 
has become so normalised that it is hardly worthy of attention. How-
ever, when a country like the Netherlands, long renowned for its strong 
protection of renters, starts to introduce temporary renting contracts as 
a normal form of tenure, this warrants significant notice. Indeed, tradi-
tionally, temporary rent has been forbidden in Dutch law, except in some 
very limited and restrictive, well-defined circumstances (Donker van 
Heel, 2004). Nevertheless, the last decade has seen a strong trend towards 
relaxing these regulations by continually expanding the exceptions (Van 
de Pest, 2013). These changes have attracted little attention or contro-
versy, partly due to the continuing perception of temporary rent as a mar-
ginal and essentially positive phenomenon that can be deployed in those 
few situations where permanent contracts are deemed untenable (Huis-
man, 2016). Very recently (2013 2015), however, a sharp shift has occurred. 
Major stakeholders in Dutch housing have started arguing that tempo-
rary contracts are inherently desirable, and the government is introduc-
ing policy which, for the first time in modern Dutch political history, 
elevates the temporary contract to the same legal status as permanent 
contracts. This is likely to have a profound impact upon the Dutch rental 
market, especially since in other countries similar policies led to the 
swift dominance of time-limited tenancies (Kadi, 2015; Morgan, 1996). 
 Where did this change come from? In order to answer this ques-
tion, policy documents, media content and parliamentary archives 
* Published previously as Huisman, C. J. (2016) ‘Temporary Tenancies in the Neth-
erlands: From Pragmatic policy Instrument to Structural Housing Market Reform’. 
International Journal of Housing Policy 16(3) 409-422 doi:10.1080/14616718.2016
.1195563.
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were analysed. Based on this analysis, this chapter develops the argu-
ment that it was exactly the slow sequence of apparently technocratic, 
uncontroversial developments surrounding temporary rent between 
1997 and 2012 which made this shift possible. By allowing more and 
more exceptions to the rules, the norm of permanent renting contracts 
was eroded. This paved the way for challenging the standard in a more 
fundamental way, a development discussed subsequently. The shift fits 
in with simultaneously occurring changes in views on the desired size 
of the rental market and the groups it should cater for. In the final part 
of this chapter we argue that given the speed of recent developments, 
the introduction of non-permanent tenancies might quickly result in 
permanent tenancies becoming the exception. If this happens, it will 
have a profound effect on the character of rental housing in the Neth-
erlands, because it will strengthen the desirability of home-ownership 
as a more secure form of housing, and relegate renting to a temporary 
solution for the young and upwardly mobile, as well as the only option 
for those who cannot afford to buy a dwelling. That a similar develop-
ment thirty years earlier in the UK rapidly resulted in an extremely 
precarious rental housing market, especially in England and Wales, 
should be food for thought.
4.2 1997-2012: Introduction, consolidation and expansion of a 
pragmatic policy instrument 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Dutch government 
sought to improve the deplorable and precarious housing conditions 
of many households (Kraaijestein, 2001). The introduction of the Dutch 
Law on Terminating Tenancies (Huuropzeggingswet) in 1918 (De Gaay Fort-
man undated, approximately, 1918; Kraaijestein, 2001) essentially forbade 
landlords to terminate tenancies unless tenants failed to fulfil some 
fundamental duties. As a result, between 1919 and 1985, temporary rent 
seems to have been almost non-existent in the Netherlands. All rental 
contracts were permanent. Unless the tenant fails to meet some minimal 
basic conditions, such as paying the rent on time or not causing gross 
nuisance, it is very difficult for a landlord to terminate a renting contract 
and evict the tenant (Dutch Civil Law Book 7:271 274). According to Dutch 
law, for instance, even when a house is to be demolished, the landlord has 
to offer the tenant a similar dwelling with a contract on the same terms 
as before, as well as compensation for moving costs (Dutch Civil Law Book 
7:274). Only in 1985 temporary renting contracts were admitted again as 
part of the Law on Vacancies (Leegstandswet), but solely as an exception in 
very specific cases where permanent contracts were deemed infeasible, 
and the alternative would be leaving the dwelling empty (with the risk of 
it being squatted) (Dutch Association of Municipalities; Vereniging Ned-
erlandse Gemeenten; VNG, 2011). They were seen as a solution for short-
term vacancies, when normal provisions such as replacement housing 
were not practical. In such instances it was thought that time-limited 
tenancies could benefit home-owners, tenants and local residents (Brokx 
& de Ruiter, 1980). They would supply rent income to owners, increase 
the available rental stock and prevent feelings of unsafety caused by 
empty buildings. Stressing the exceptional status of time-limited tenan-
cies, strict conditions applied. The owner could only apply for a permit 
to rent out the dwelling temporarily in the case of previously owner-oc-
cupied or newly built dwellings that were for sale or, in case of previously 
rented dwellings, if they were to be demolished or rebuilt soon.1 Further-
more, as with the majority of all Dutch rental housing, then and now 
(Haffner & Boumeester, 2010; Van der Schaar, 1987), rent ceilings applied. 
There is no evidence that extensive use was made of temporary renting 
contracts after their introduction in 1985. According to the Dutch associ-
ation of owner-occupiers for instance, no private home-owners ever uti-
lised this possibility (Vereniging Eigen Huis, 2015).
 To provide some context, throughout almost all of the twentieth 
century the majority of all Dutch households lived in rented accommo-
dation2 (Van der Schaar, 1987, Statistics Netherlands), and consecutive 
governments stimulated renting as well as owner-occupation. By the late 
1980s, however, the policy started to focus exclusively on the expansion 
of home-ownership, and while still substantial in absolute numbers, 
over time the ever-shrinking rental sector became more and more dis-
cursively projected as a residual form of tenure for those who could not 
support themselves (yet). It is against this backdrop that in 1997, more 
than a decade after the introduction of the Law on Vacancies, landlords 
start engaging substantially with renting out dwellings on a non-perma-
nent contract. 
 One of the first domains where time-limited tenancies emerged was 
urban renewal. At the end of the 1990s, due to the policy of upgrading dis-
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advantaged neighbourhoods through state-led gentrification (Teernstra 
& Pinkster 2016; Uitermark et al., 2007), many dwellings, predominantly 
owned by housing corporations,3 were being rebuilt. Traditionally such 
dwellings were left empty and boarded up if vacated shortly before ren-
ovation or demolition. To improve the liveability of the neighbourhood, 
the dwellings were now rented out on temporary contracts instead. The 
urban renewal plans from the late 1990s and early 2000s were very ambi-
tious, and construction soon stagnated (Priemus, 2004; Vromraad, 
2002). This was compounded by the advent of the global financial crisis 
of 2007 2008 and the ensuing economic recession. Due to the delays, the 
number of dwellings rented out on temporary contracts, as well as the 
total time that they were rented out on such tenancies, increased signif-
icantly (Dekker, 2003). While many renewal plans were postponed indef-
initely, housing corporations did not transform the temporary contracts 
into permanent ones (Dutch Union of Tenants, 2015). Although this was 
against the rules, no enforcement by the government took place.
 Student housing was the second area where temporary tenancies 
were introduced. Before 1997, tenancies for dedicated student housing 
were permanent, just as all other rental contracts in the Netherlands. 
While it was necessary to fulfil the condition of pursuing academic 
studies to enter the tenancy, ceasing this education (either through fin-
ishing the degree or quitting) could not result in termination of the ten-
ancy (Nieuwenhuijsen, 2006). During the 1990s the number of students 
enrolled in higher education stabilised, but the supply of housing avail-
able to them actually decreased. The focus on larger, higher quality own-
er-occupied housing resulted in the disappearance of affordable housing 
through demolition, upgrading and tenure conversion as well as in a lack 
of new suitable construction (Oskamp & Hoppesteyn, 2003). To max-
imise efficiency, from 1997 onwards a small local housing corporation 
specialising in student accommodation (Duwo), attempted to intro-
duce so-called campus contracts. Such agreements contain a stipulation 
stating the tenancy will be terminated when tenants cease their studies. 
However, such a clause lacked a basis in Dutch law, as resulting test court 
cases showed (Nieuwenhuijsen, 2006). Around the year 2000 interest 
group Kences, uniting most housing corporations specialised in student 
accommodation in the Netherlands, started lobbying for legalisation 
of such contracts. When in 2006 the law was indeed changed, it was the 
first incidence in the Netherlands of temporary rent conditional on the 
status of the tenant rather than conditional on the status of the house. 
As the name implies, campus contracts were initially only deployed in 
designated student housing at university premises. However, quickly 
already before they were legalised the use of such contracts spread from 
the campus to normal residential neighbourhoods and all other parts 
of university cities. Soon, in almost all situations where students rented 
through housing corporations, campus contracts became the norm 
(Companen, 2010; Municipality of Amsterdam, 2005). 
 The third field in which non-permanent rental arrangements 
emerged in the period 1997 2012 was as a way to prevent vacancies in 
dwellings for sale. Due to the policy of transferring a large amount of 
rental stock to the owner-occupied sector (Priemus, 2004), many previ-
ously rented dwellings entered the market. Temporary rent in the formal 
sense (i.e. with a permit) was not allowed (Dekker, 2005) in order to pre-
vent strategic misuse such as symbolically putting a dwelling on the 
market to circumvent rent protection (Brokx & de Ruiter, 1980; Spies, 
2011). Nevertheless, during this period housing corporations often let 
these dwellings temporarily, using somewhat controversial legal con-
structions (Blok, 2013; De Zeeuw, 2005). Both ‘use agreements’ and ‘anti-
squat’ are explicitly designed to circumvent formal renting law and 
allow properties to be let out under highly precarious circumstances 
for the tenant (Martinez-Lopez, 2013; Priemus, 2015; Van Eijck & Naafs, 
2014).4 For owner-occupied homes temporary rent came into view via a 
different route. Due to the global financial crisis which began in 2007, 
dwellings became much more difficult to sell. The average length of time 
for a dwelling to be on the market increased significantly (Schilder & 
Conijn, 2013). The growing group of owner-occupiers active on the hous-
ing market felt squeezed by this, arguing they often faced a double mort-
gage burden: the mortgage for their new home, as well as the monthly 
payments for their as-yet unsold old home. Following this logic, the 
Dutch association of owner-occupiers successfully launched a lobby 
to remove all perceived barriers to temporary rent of dwellings for sale, 
such as rent ceilings (VNG, 2013). 
 With the possible exception of the growing use of anti-squat 
(Priemus, 2015), none of the developments described above have been 
particularly controversial. They all have an ad hoc, pragmatic flavour 
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and a win-win feel, offering a fix for specific technical problems encoun-
tered by landlords and at the same time creating (temporary) living 
space where there was hitherto only vacancy. Yet the compound effect 
of all these changes was significant. To start with, there were volume 
and normalisation effects: temporary contracts became increasingly 
familiar to both tenants and landlords, with housing corporations and 
real estate agents gaining bureaucratic experience in administering 
such tenancies. Also, unlike with permanent contracts, the allocation 
of temporary contracts is unregulated. Housing corporations can issue 
contracts to whichever individuals or categories of people they prefer. 
As such, the growth of temporary rent normalised the distribution 
of rental housing outside existing distribution regulations. Indeed, 
sometimes extensive use of temporary rent is now de facto supplanting 
permanent contracts, not augmenting them. In some urban renewal 
districts, for example, temporary rent has taken on a semi-permanent 
character as unclear future renovations are pushed back repeatedly. 
Due to the technocratic character of the debate, the point is rarely made 
that these houses have been effectively withdrawn from the regulated 
housing supply for the best part of a decade; such distribution issues are 
seldom raised (but see Dutch Union of Tenants, 2015). tabel 4.1 
Furthermore, this institutionalisation of temporary rent has been 
strengthened by, at the municipal level, patchy or non-existent 
enforcement of the laws that, in theory, curb misuse by landlords, 
while the working assumption at national policy level and discursively 
is that they are enforced. This is significant because regulatory relax-
ation, for instance the introduction of campus contracts, has so far 
always led to utilisation in a far wider array of situations than origi-
nally planned or claimed. Relatedly, at the level of national government 
a sequence of significant relaxations of laws to make permit-based 
temporary rent possible in an ever wider array of situations, for ever-
longer periods of time has continued the trend towards deregulation. 
For instance, the window of time during which home-owners are in 
some cases allowed to rent out their dwellings with temporary tenan-
cies was initially 3 years, but was then extended to 5 years, followed by 
further extensions to 7 or sometimes even 10 years (see Tables 4.1 and 
4.2, Dekker, 2003, 2005, Van de Pest, 2013, VNG, 2013). tabel 4.2
Lastly, and not to be understated, the expansion of temporary rent has 
not occurred in a vacuum. The Dutch housing discourse is increasingly 
moving towards the benefits of home-ownership (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 
2005) and away from (regulated) renting, and tenure transformation 
Table 4.2 
Extension of exceptions in which home-owners can obtain 
governmental permission to issue temporary tenancies on 
their dwellings
     
Period Permitted situations
Pre-2006 Shortly before renovation/demolition
 Owner-occupied dwellings for sale — strict conditions apply
2006-2012 Shortly before renovation/ demolition
 Owner-occupied dwellings for sale — strict conditions apply
 Student housing
Post-2012 Shortly before renovation/demolition
 Owner-occupied dwellings for sale — strict conditions lifted
 Student housing
Table 4.1 
Maximum period a landlord can obtain permission from the 
government to issue temporary tenancies in the Netherlands
     
Period Maximum time period
Pre-2005  3 years
2005–2012 5 years
post-2012 7 years — social housing  (demolition/renovation) 
 10 years — office buildings
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(Priemus, 2004) has been a major driving force behind the expansion 
of temporary rent. The current meritocratic discourse (Young, 1958), 
which advocates allocation of living space based on merit, naturally 
extends to the argument that rental contracts should be temporary 
rather than permanent (cf. Heijkamp & Griffioen, 2015; Heijkamp & 
Borstnik, 2016). All these factors contributed to the sharp shift that was 
witnessed in 2013, which we now describe.
4.3 2013-2015: Structural housing market reform
In July 2013, around the same time the latest relaxation of the regula-
tions on temporary rent came into force, Amsterdam housing corpo-
ration Stadgenoot launched a plan for introducing generic temporary 
contracts:
The idea of the five-year contract builds on the flexibilisation in the 
rental sector due to the introduction of the campus and youth con-
tracts. In January 2012, the Minister made further flexibilisation 
possible for dwellings that are for sale; the possibilities for tem-
porary rent based on the Law on Vacancies have already been wid-
ened too. Now, we propose the next step, namely a simple, easy and 
generically applicable device: the five-year contract.
De Langen & Anderiesen, 2013, translation ours.
Stadgenoot’s plan constitutes a clear break with the old logic. No longer 
is the argument that time-limited tenancies will persuade landlords to 
rent out their transitionally vacant houses. The distinctly new element 
is that they want to use the timelimited tenancy to change the way 
housing is distributed. Rather than allocating rental housing through 
waiting time, as is usual now for most rental housing in the Nether-
lands, the new goal is to supply specific groups, such as starters, with 
a chance to enter the housing market earlier. When the five years have 
finished, they either have made progress in their professional careers, 
and will be able to afford more expensive free-market housing, or they 
will have to relocate to less desired, less central city districts (Nolles, 
2013). In either case they will have to move, which is evaluated posi-
tively by Stadgenoot as ‘more dynamism on the housing market’. 
 By September 2013, Stadgenoot had convinced the four other main 
Amsterdam housing corporations of the necessity to exert influence. 
Through the Amsterdam newspaper Het Parool they announced a large 
lobby campaign in The Hague, the seat of the government, in order 
to ‘try to force through a change of the law that will make temporary 
renting contracts possible in the city’ (Nolles, 2013, translation ours). 
Indeed, in November 2013 the small orthodox Christian political party 
Christenunie launched a pre-proposal for a bill introducing five-year 
renting contracts for young people (Schouten, De Snoo, & Visser, 2013). 
The Dutch Union of Tenants (Woonbond) did not agree: ‘The starters’ 
contract will put tenants out on the streets without any rights’ (Buite-
laar, 2013, translation ours). They contended that only an increase in 
new construction will offer a structural solution to the continuing 
housing shortage in many Dutch cities. In February 2014 the aldermen 
of major Dutch cities Amsterdam and Utrecht (later joined by their Den 
Haag and Rotterdam colleagues) joined the lobby for what are by then 
dubbed ‘nomad contracts’ by the Union of Tenants (C. Huisman, 2014). 
In April 2014, Dutch Minister of Housing Stef Blok announced the gov-
ernment’s intention to introduce temporary contracts. He did this 
in a letter to the Lower Chamber of Parliament that like most Dutch 
housing policy contains a complicated mix of wishes and ideas from 
different stakeholders. On the one hand, the category of temporary 
rent conditional on the status of the tenant, introduced in 2006 with 
campus contracts for students, will be extended with contracts for 
young people (age 18-28), large families (households consisting of eight 
or more persons) or any other category government wishes to define. 
On the other hand, the category of temporary rent conditional on the 
status of the house will also be extended. 
 The most important proposal, however, is to introduce generic tem-
porary contracts as a normal form of tenure (Blok, 2014). According to 
the Minister, it is a simple solution to the many requests for excep-
tions he received from representatives of home-owners. The proposed 
contracts will have a maximum duration of two years. They can be 
concluded not just with specific groups, but with anybody. To protect 
renters, Minister Blok argues, they cannot be renewed (but can be trans-
formed into permanent tenancies), so tenants cannot have a string of 
such contracts with the same owner. However, otherwise, there are no 
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preconditions for their use: they can be used anytime, anyplace. As far 
as can be gleaned from the letter, landlords will be allowed to engage 
in a perpetual string of such contracts, only not with the same tenant. 
Blok asserts that the high transaction costs associated with renting out 
a dwelling every two years will dissuade landlords from engaging en 
masse in them. There exists a real danger, however, analogous to earlier 
developments in Dutch labour law (Dirks, 2000), that tenants will be 
evicted to be replaced with new tenants on another temporary contract. 
 In September 2014 the proposal was published online, inviting 
input from interested parties.5 Perhaps predictably, the internet 
consultation yielded mainly positive appraisals by representatives 
of house-owners such as the Dutch associations of housing corpora-
tions and real estate investors, while spokespersons for renter organ-
isations were mostly negative. In July 2015 Minister Blok announced 
that the proposal is to be discussed in Parliament in autumn 2015, and 
if swiftly agreed upon it can come into effect by February 2016. Not-
withstanding some internal disagreements, it is backed by the ruling 
coalition of Dutch Labour party PvdA and the VVD, a right-wing lib-
eral party. While the Socialist Party, the third largest party in the 
Lower Chamber, might oppose the proposal, this will likely be offset 
by endorsement from the almost as large right-wing PVV or the cen-
tre-right CDA and other parties. tabel 4.3
To summarise, the Netherlands is moving from a situation in which 
temporary tenancies were only allowed as an exception for a limited, 
restricted number of reasons, and for which in most cases a permit was 
required, including a limit on the maximum period of use, to a situa-
tion where temporary tenancies will become a normal form of tenure, 
with no need for a reason, no permit, and no limit on their use (Table 
4.3). This constitutes a shift from permanent renting contracts as the 
norm, with temporary contracts as a marginal exception, to the intro-
duction of temporary contracts as a normal form of tenure. The ques-
tion is: will this shift be followed by a development where temporary 
renting contracts become the norm?
4.4 Conclusion: From pragmatic policy instrument to structural 
housing market reform… and beyond?
This chapter has charted the recent development towards introduc-
ing time-limited tenancies in the Netherlands. At first glance, given 
the Dutch tradition of strong renter protection, this policy switch 
seems hard to understand. We have attempted to clarify this by look-
ing closely at the emergence of temporary renting contracts in the 
period 1997 2012. We found that during these years, time-limited ten-
ancies were first presented as solutions to specific, short-term prob-
lems, such as vacancies before renovation or demolition of houses. 
However, over time the emphasis has shifted towards changing the 
way housing is distributed and promoting dynamism on the hous-
ing market. Moreover, the temporary contract became increasingly 
visible and mainstream. This can be attributed to specific market 
dynamics (overambitious/ stagnating urban renewal, the impact of 
the financial crisis on both the private and public housing sector, the 
continuing transfer of housing from the rental to the owner-occupied 
sector), the continued relaxation of regulations, and the self-reinforc-
ing effect of the increasing use of temporary rent as a policy instru-
ment for creating temporary housing for selected target groups such 
as students. At the same time, and closely coupled with the sectoral 
Table 4.3 
Proposed further relaxation of regulations on temporary rent 
in the Netherlands in 2016
     
Permitted situations - All dwellings, all circumstances
 - Landlord can engage in unlimited number of temporary 
    contracts (with different tenants)
Maximum window - Unlimited (for the landlord)
Restrictions - Contract can be between 1 and 24 months, not longer
 - Contract cannot be renewed with same tenant (but can be
    transformed into a permanent contract)
 - Rent ceilings apply in some situations
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shift towards home-ownership, access to housing became increas-
ingly discursively framed as a meritocratic issue, that is, something 
to be earned. The permanent contract does not sit comfortably within 
such a discourse. 
 All these factors accumulated so that by 2013 a tipping point had 
been reached. Temporary tenancies were no longer viewed as infre-
quently occurring exceptions for well-defined situations, but as a 
normal part of the market, and an inherently desirable goal in them-
selves. Housing corporations and local politicians (predominantly 
from the major Dutch cities) as well as national political parties started 
a lobby to make the temporary tenancy a normal alternative to the per-
manent tenancy. The Dutch government responded by recently (2014) 
announcing the recognition and legalisation of the temporary tenancy 
within standard Dutch renting law (as opposed to its current status as 
at least in theory a carefully circumscribed exception). This is the first 
time in modern Dutch history that this has happened, and the obvious 
question is how this regulatory normalisation will impact upon the 
Dutch housing market in the coming years assuming, as is likely, that 
the Dutch Parliament ratifies the proposal. This is not such a strange 
thing to ask, given the earlier, similar development in the United King-
dom, where until the end of the 1970s the permanent renting contract 
was commonplace. 
 Indeed, due to a sequence of reforms between 1979 and 1996 the per-
manent renting contract was practically abolished in the United King-
dom (Kemp & Keoghan, 2001; Kemp, 2009; Morgan, 1996), highlighting 
how quickly huge changes can occur once the first explicit step has 
been taken. The rental market in the United Kingdom (comprising 
37% of all housing, British Office for National Statistics) is now, espe-
cially in England, notoriously precarious. Time-limited tenancies of 
6 months have become the standard, and (especially in London) rents 
are soaring (Bachelor, 2015), with rent control limited to social hous-
ing. Where will the Dutch rental sector (currently 44% of the national 
stock, Statistics Netherlands) be 20 years from now? Especially given 
the growing scarcity of rental housing, it is likely that many Dutch 
landlords will henceforth opt for short-term contracts rather than per-
manent contracts because of the increased flexibility it will offer them. 
Yet the Dutch mainstream media pays scant attention to these issues. 
Will this lack of interest fuel a new phase of deregulation, such as the 
removal of rent ceilings? 
 This absence of attention is also significant because, as the UK again 
demonstrates, it is far more difficult to reverse deregulation than to 
implement it in the first place, even when there is substantial politi-
cal support for it. There the emergence of Generation Rent traditionally 
home-owning sections of the population now forced to rely long-term 
on the precarious rental sector given the unavailability of homes they 
can afford to buy has bolstered support for stronger protection of rent-
ers. However, meaningful reform is unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
If, as expected, the two-year contract becomes law in the Netherlands, 
under which circumstances will a future Dutch government be willing 
and able to re-regulate? As illustrated by the quotation at the begin-
ning of this chapter, Minister Blok has stated that temporary contracts 
should not displace permanent contracts as the norm, but the actions 
of his government are establishing the conditions for exactly this to 
happen.
Post-script
At the end of April 2016, at the time this chapter was accepted as an arti-
cle, the law, as expected, had been just passed by the Dutch parliament, 
with only some minor changes. All major political parties backed it, 
and the law will come into effect as of July 2016. 
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Notes
1 The Law on Vacancies also introduced temporary tenancies for vacant build-
ings not previously used for housing such as offices under similar conditions as 
for housing.
2 Between 1920 and 1990 the proportion of households renting gradually 
decreased from 82% to 55% of all Dutch households (Van der Schaar, 1987, Sta-
tistics Netherlands). By 1997, the distribution between renting and home-own-
ership was exactly 50% 50%. Since then, both the number and the proportion of 
households renting has continued to shrink slightly, so that by 2014 44% rented 
and 56% owned their home (DGW/ABF Research, 2015). 
3 Housing corporations are not-for profit organisations that own the greatest share 
of the Dutch rental housing stock (C.J. Huisman, 2014).
4 Indeed, the period 1997 2012 also saw growing use of these constructions 
(Priemus, 2015). We do not discuss these further here because, due to their 
somewhat idiosyncratic character, they are still a long way from obtaining the 
kind of discursive and regulatory acceptance that temporary rent increasingly 
enjoys. The same applies to the municipality of Amsterdam’s experiments with 
‘youth contracts’.
5 https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/tijdelijkehuur
 
